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Casual empiricism suggests that deceptive advertising about product quality is prevalent, and several
classes of theories explore its causes and consequences. We provide some unusually sharp empirical
evidence on the extent, mechanics, and dynamics of deceptive advertising. Ski resorts self-report substantially
more natural snowfall on weekends. Resorts that plausibly reap greater benefits from exaggerating
do it more. Data on website visits suggests that consumers are appropriately skeptical of weekend
reports. We find little evidence that competition restrains or encourages exaggeration. Near the end
of our sample period, a new iPhone application feature makes it easier for skiers share information
















“Jackson Hole/Teton Village DID NOT get 15” today…more like 0” 
-Skier comment posted on SkiReport.com, 3/15/2009 
 
Casual empiricism suggests that deceptive advertising about product quality is prevalent, and 
several classes of theories explore its causes and consequences.
1
We test for deceptive advertising by examining a critical component of product quality at 
ski resorts: new, natural (or “fresh”) snowfall in the past 24 hours. Ski resorts issue "snow 
reports" on their websites roughly once a day. These reports are also collected by aggregators 
and then rebroadcast over the Internet and via print and broadcast media. A skier wishing to 
ski on new, natural snow can use these snow reports to help decide whether and where to ski 
on a particular day. In principle, snow reports provide skiers with location-specific 
information on fresh snowfall that is not necessarily captured by third-party weather websites. 
We find confirming evidence, from resort website visits, that consumer demand responds to 
both resort- and government-reported snow.  
  Yet there is little sharp 
empirical evidence that speaks to such theories. This gap is  due in part to formidable 
measurement challenges; in most settings, measuring deceptive advertising requires detailed, 
high-frequency information (on ads, product quality, and inventories) that is difficult to 
observe. 
The dynamics of customer acquisition by ski resorts suggest that the optimal (deceptive) 
advertising strategy may vary at high frequencies. Resorts only benefit from exaggerating 
                                                 
1 Lazear (1995) models firms taking advantage of high consumer search costs by “baiting” consumers with a 
high quality good that is not actually in-stock, and then “switching” consumers to a lower quality good that is in-
stock. In signal-jamming  models  (e.g.,  Holmstrom  (1999)), agents engage in costly effort to upwardly bias 
signals of their quality, but rational recipients of these signals anticipate these efforts and no information is lost. 
Other models focus on deception more generally, with motivating examples from advertising; e.g., Ettinger and 
Jehiel (2010). See also footnote 10 below. 2 
 
snow reports when skiers condition purchase decisions on them.  The cost of exaggeration is 
angering or losing credibility with skiers, including those who have already pre-committed 
(e.g., as part of a multi-day vacation) but use the snow report to help plan their day. The pre-
committed should represent a larger share of (potential) skiers on weekdays than on 
weekends, when many skiers are less constrained by work schedules and (we hypothesize) 
more likely to condition resort choice on snow conditions. So if there is deceptive advertising 
we should expect to see more of it designed to attract weekend skiers. 
We test that hypothesis using data from 2004-2008, and find that resorts do indeed report 
23 percent more new natural snow on Saturday and Sunday mornings (1.59 inches vs. 1.29 
inches, p-value = 0.014). This “weekend effect” is substantial in absolute as well as 
percentage terms. New natural snow only falls during about 30% of the days in our sample, 
and our results also suggest that many resorts report accurately. Overall then, our results 
suggest that, when exaggerating, resorts report an inch or more of additional fresh snow on 
weekends.
2
To be fair, it is not completely implausible that there might be a weekend effect in actual 
snow.  There is a small literature in climatology that suggests that day of week effects in 
pollution affect precipitation and temperature, and thus may affect snowfall.  The estimated 
effects are quite small (relative to the 23 percent difference in resort-reported snow we find) 
and of mixed sign.
 
3
                                                 
2 In addition to reporting new natural snow, resorts also report other aspects of snow quantity and quality, such as 
base depth, number of trails open, and surface conditions (e.g., powder, packed powder).  These other aspects 
can be influenced by manmade snow and hence we do not examine them.   
  Nevertheless, we control for government-reported snow in all of our key 
empirical specifications, and find that doing this cuts the weekend effect by one-quarter to 
3 Cerveney and Balling (1998) find higher CO and O3 levels and higher precipitation on Fridays and Saturdays.  
Effects are primarily in areas downwind of the U.S. Eastern seacoast. Forster and Solomon (2003) find that 
nighttime low temperatures are 0.2 to 0.4 degrees Celsius higher on weekends in the middle of the United States 
but are 0.1 to 0.2 degrees lower in the Southeast and Southwest (weekend effects in the Northeast and West, 
where most of our resorts are located, are smaller).     3 
 
one-third  but  improves the precision of estimates, leaving them both  statistically and 
economically significant. 
Having found some evidence that deceptive advertising varies within resorts over time 
along with payoffs, we next explore whether deceptive advertising varies across resorts with 
plausibly different payoffs. Weekend effects in resort reporting are larger for resorts with 
more expert terrain and for those that do not offer a money back guarantee. This is consistent 
with expert skiers valuing fresh snow more highly, and with guarantees and deception being 
substitutes. We do not find any statistically significant differences in deceptive advertising 
across density of competition,  population within 150 miles, or resort ownership type 
(government, privately held firm, or publicly-traded), although these null effects are 
imprecisely estimated. 
Next we explore whether consumers (partly) pierce the veil of resort exaggeration, using 
daily data on resort website visits, by unique visitors residing within 150 miles of a given 
resort, before 10AM.
4 A resort snow report can drive traffic to its website because, as noted 
above, resort reports are rebroadcast by third-party aggregator websites and offline media 
outlets. Consumers exposed to a rebroadcast may then visit a resort website to get additional 
information on conditions, prices, services, and other aspects of trip planning.
5
                                                 
4 We conducted this study without industry cooperation, and hence our data on resorts is limited to what we 
could gather from websites. Nearly all resorts are privately held so publicly available financial information on 
them is scarce, particularly at the daily frequency. 
 So website 
visits are a useful, if incomplete, measure of consumer demand responses to resort snowfall 
reports. We find that, across all days, visits increase by more than 100% for each additional 
inch of government-reported snow, and by 61% for each additional inch of resort-reported 
snow. Visits do not respond differently to government-reported snow on weekends  vs. 
5 Unfortunately we lack data on these within-site clicks that would enable us to observe what sorts of content site 
visitors peruse. 4 
 
weekdays, but are sharply less responsive to resort-reported snow on weekends; in fact, our 
results suggest consumers only respond to additional resort-reported snow on weekdays. In 
all, the website visit results suggest that consumers are skeptical of resorts’ weekend reports 
of fresh snowfall. 
Why then do resorts exaggerate? Our evidence on website visits does not rule out that 
(some) resorts benefitted weakly from exaggerating fresh snowfall on weekends; e.g., there 
may have been a small increase in demand that we do not detect, offset by only a minimal cost 
of false advertising. If this was the case, then a perturbation, even a mild one, of the cost-
benefit calculus could have large effects on the extent of deceptive advertising. And that is 
indeed what we find: ski resorts more or less stop exaggerating fresh snowfall after a 
technology shock reduces the cost of rapid information sharing between customers. In January 
2009, SkiReport.com added a new feature to its popular iPhone application that makes it easier 
for skiers to post "first-hand reports" alongside the resort-provided reports. This feature 
sparked a sharp increase in the amount and timeliness of skier feedback on the accuracy of 
resort reports, with many first-hand reports filed from the chairlift or the lodge. But first-hand 
reports spike only at resorts with adequate coverage from AT&T's data network, and these 
covered resorts experience a disproportionate post-launch drop in exaggeration. 
In all, our results suggest that deceptive advertising about product quality responds sharply 
to incentives (as they vary both within-resort, over-time, as is the case with both the weekend 
effect and the  iPhone app launch, and as they vary across resorts with different 
characteristics). Consumers respond only weakly to exaggerated claims, and hence deception 
may have produced few benefits for the advertisers in equilibrium. This may help explain why 5 
 
a simple third-party technological innovation, that plausibly only slightly changed the cost-
benefit calculus, dramatically reduced resort snow report exaggeration. 
The latter finding adds to the literature on how customer feedback on product/service 
quality affects firm behavior and equilibrium.
6 It also complements prior work showing that 
third-party quality disclosure can change firm behavior.
7 Our finding of significant product 
quality exaggeration (in the pre-iPhone app equilibrium) builds on Jin and Kato (2006), who 
audit claims about the quality of baseball cards being auctioned on eBay and find evidence of 
exaggeration.
8
Although our findings provide unusually sharp evidence on the nature and dynamics of 
deceptive advertising, our setup can only identify a subset of the behaviors of interest for 
modeling and policy analysis. As noted above, we lack any data directly related to resort 
profit functions, and hence cannot measure the demand responses to snow reports with depth 
or precision. This prevents us from sharply testing across the models discussed at the outset or 
measuring the welfare implications of (changes in) advertising practices. Moreover, as with 
any study of a single industry, the external validity of our findings to other markets is 
uncertain.  
 Jin and Kato's analysis focuses on the effect of deceptive claims on demand 
and auction prices, whereas our focus is more on the supply of deception and its response to a 
technology shock. 
Our findings nevertheless have potentially broad applicability, as the market for skiers 
does not seem uniquely suited to deceptively advertising. There are many other markets where 
                                                 
6 This literature has focused to a great extent on eBay; see, e.g., Cabral and Hortascu (2010) and cites therein. 
See also Hubbard (2002) on auto repair and Luca (2011) on restaurants. 
7 See, e.g., Sauer and Leffler (1990); Dranove and Jin (2010). Beales et al (1981) provide an overview of legal 
limitations  on deceptive advertising. Jolls and Sunstein (2006)  discuss behavioral motives for government 
regulation of advertising.  
8 See also Ellison and Ellison (2009) for evidence of firm practices that “frustrate consumer search or make it 
less damaging to firms” in the Pricewatch shopping engine for computer parts. 6 
 
search and switching costs loom large.
9 And many of the other conditions that contribute to 
deception in theory do not seem to prevail in our setting. Ski area customers get immediate 
and visceral feedback on the accuracy of snow reports. The potential for repeat play and 
learning is high.
10
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II details  our data  on snowfall and on resort 
characteristics. Section III details our identification strategy and results. Section IV concludes. 
 And the entry and exit rates of ski areas are low: there are few if any “fly-
by-night” players with incentives to commit outright fraud. So we speculate that there are 
many other markets where conditions are ripe for deceptive advertising that varies sharply 
with advertiser incentives. 
 
II. Snowfall and Resort Data 
Our data for measuring product quality and its reporting consists of resort-provided snow 
reports, government snow data, and resort characteristics. 
We collect resort-provided reports from the websites of two popular aggregators:  
SkiReport.com and OnTheSnow.com. These websites do not supply archives of ski reports and 
thus we are forced to assemble our data from different sources. From February 15, 2008 until 
the end of our sample  in May 2009, we collected snow reports once per day from 
SkiReport.com.
11
                                                 
9 In our setting, on a one-shot basis, driving times are substantial even between “neighboring” resorts. On a 
longer-term basis, some consumers may find it costly to coordinate with peers on alternative destinations or to 
learn how to navigate the terrain and ancillary services (parking, rentals, dining, lodging) of a new mountain. 
  We collected snow reports from earlier time periods from two private 
Internet archives. Since these archives had better coverage of OnTheSnow.com, we used 
10 The immediate feedback stands in contrast to the examples (e.g., tobacco use, investment advice) that motivate 
Glaeser and Ujelyi (2010) and Kartik et al (2007). The visceral feedback (and high stakes) contrasts with the 
“low involvement situations” (e.g.,. voting, cheap products) that can make consumers susceptible to persuasion 
in Mullainathan et al (2008). 
11 Since we circulated the first draft of this paper in mid-2009, both Skireport.com and Mountain News 
Corporation, the owner of Onthesnow.com, have been purchased by Vail Resorts. Skireport.com now redirects to 
Onthesnow.com.   7 
 
archived reports from this website. In the data collected from Internet archives, we are limited 
to collecting data for days on which the relevant web page was archived. We collect snow 
reports from archived pages that summarize all reports from a given state or province, so an 
entire state's data is either archived or not on a given day.  The frequency of data collection in 
these archives increases over time. In the 2004-5 and 2005-6 seasons, snow reports are 
available for only about 10 percent of resort-days between December and March. This ratio 
rises to 30 percent in the 2006-7 season and 65 percent in the 2007-8 season. 
The archiving process is Internet-wide, so it seems reasonable to assume that the archiving 
of data for a resort should be exogenous to actual or reported snow. We test this assumption in 
three ways. First, we test whether reports were more likely to be archived on certain days of 
the week, and find that weekends account for almost exactly two sevenths of our resort reports 
(28.4%, p-value of difference from 2/7 = 0.945). Second, we simply examine the timing of the 
reports, finding that in one of our archives it increased from once every ten days, to once 
every five days, to once every three days, to essentially every day. Archiving frequencies were 
higher for states with more resorts (e.g., Colorado vs. Missouri), suggesting that the archiving 
of a page containing a state's snow reports responded to that webpage's popularity, but the 
regular sampling frequencies suggested that this response was not happening at high enough 
frequency to contribute to a weekend effect. Third, we test whether the availability of a report 
is correlated with an interaction of government-reported snow (which we can measure on days 
when resort-reported snow is missing from the archives) and a weekend indicator variable, 
and find no evidence that it is (results discussed below, and reported in Table 5). 
We compare the resort reports of new snowfall to government data from two sources: 
actual reported snowfall from nearby government weather stations, and estimated snowfall 8 
 
from the Snow Data Assimilation System (SNODAS), a U.S. National Weather Service model 
that provides estimated snowfall from satellite, ground station, and airborne weather data 
collection.
12  SNODAS data are available for any point in the continental United States on a 
30-arc-second grid.
13  We take the largest of the 25 SNODAS estimates from the 5x5 grid 
surrounding the main resort mountain as the estimate of actual snowfall that we match to the 
resort snow report.
14
For the government weather stations, we match each resort with to up to 20 National 
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) or National Operational Hydrologic 
Remote Sensing Center (NOHRSC) weather stations within 100 miles horizontally and at 
elevations within 1000 feet of the resort summit.
 
15
In matching the resort and government snow data, we match time periods as closely as 
possible. Resorts can issue and update snow reports on aggregator websites at any time, but 
they usually issue a report early in the morning local time.
 We match each resort snow report to mean 
reported snow from the surrounding stations that meet these criteria. 
16
                                                 
12 SNODAS data are described and available at http://nsidc.org/data/g02158.html. 
 This report is timed to capture as 
13 Thirty arc seconds are roughly 930 meters North-South and 660 meters East-West (at 45 degrees latitude).   
14 We collect data on the latitude and longitude of resort mountains primarily from the U.S. Geological Survey, 
and supplement this data with hand-collected information from Google Maps. 
15  NOAA station data is described at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/ghcn-daily/. NOHRSC station data is 
described at http://www.nohrsc.noaa.gov/nsa/reports.html. We match weather stations using a loss function of 
the distance in miles plus 0.1 times the difference between summit and station elevation in feet. The average 
matched station is 26 miles away and 160 feet below the summit for Eastern resorts and 52 miles away and 280 
feet below the summit for Western resorts. Twenty-eight out of 437 resorts do not have matching weather 
stations due to the elevation restriction (19 of these are in Western Canada).    
16 Our data collection methods will usually capture the last snow report issued on a given day (midnight-to-
midnight local time), rather than the first. In data collected from Internet archives, we can determine the date and 
time of a snow report from a timestamp. In the data we collect ourselves, we collect snow reports at midnight 
Eastern time, so these reports will be the last issued on a given calendar day. If a resort receives snowfall during 
the day and updates its snow report, it is possible that the same snowfall will appear in the snow report for two 
consecutive days. For instance, if a resort received snow on Saturday morning between 8 AM and noon, it may 
issue an updated snow report at noon Saturday that includes this snow, as well as a regular snow report Sunday 
morning at 6 AM that includes the snow. To the extent resorts issue more updated snow reports on weekends, 
this may lead to more double counting of weekend snow and may contribute to our result. In practice, however, 
updated snow reports are quite rare. Of the 1504 times our third-party archives captured the same resort twice on 9 
 
much overnight snowfall as possible while still being available in time to affect that day's 
skier purchasing decisions. Saturday's snow report issued at 7 AM local time would therefore 
reflect snowfall from 7 AM Friday to 7 AM Saturday, and so we attempt to match the 
Saturday resort report with SNODAS and government data from this time period. NOHRSC 
reports typically cover a 24-hour period beginning at 7 AM local time, so this matches the 
timing of resort reports well. NOAA stations aggregate their data into 24-hour periods 
beginning at midnight Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), which corresponds to 7 PM 
Eastern Standard Time (EST) and 4 PM Pacific Standard Time (PST) in winter months. Since 
NOHRSC reports provide a better match with the timing of the resort reports, we match with 
NOAA reports only if matched NOHRSC stations are not available. SNODAS aggregates its 
data into 24-hour periods that begin at 6 AM (UTC), or 1 AM EST and 10 PM PST. Our 
analysis accounts for this asynchronicity. 
Table 1 provides statistics on the distribution of our resort and snowfall observations 
across region and time period. We include resorts in the U.S. and Canada in our sample. We 
distinguish between Eastern and Western resorts, defining Eastern as states and provinces that 
are entirely east of the Continental Divide. Eastern mountains have lower elevations, and we 
are able to match more Eastern mountains to government weather stations that are within 
1000 feet of summit elevation. SNODAS forecasts are not available in Canada, but are 
available for essentially all U.S. resorts. As mentioned above, the frequency of resort snow 
reports increases later in the sample, from about 12-13 reports per resort*year in 2004-5 and 
2005-6, to 39 in 2006-7, to 70-75 in 2007-8 and 2008-9.  Our analysis of the weekend effect 
                                                                                                                                                         
one day, on only 62 times (4.5 percent) had the resort report been updated, and these instances were not 
disproportionately on weekends or weekdays.  10 
 
will focus on the 2004-8 seasons, and we will use the 2008-9 season to measure how the 
weekend effect changed following the introduction of the iPhone application. 
Table 2, Panel A describes some additional characteristics on the resorts in our sample.  
Eastern and Western resorts differ on many of these characteristics, and so we report separate 
summary statistics for each group. Western resorts classify a larger share of their terrain as 
Expert (double black diamond), Advanced (black diamond) or, Intermediate (blue square), 
whereas Eastern resorts have a higher share of Beginner (green circle) terrain. Eastern 
mountains have lower base and summit elevations and vertical drops that are 60 percent 
smaller. Eastern resorts have roughly similar numbers of lifts, but less than half as many runs 
and one-ninth as many skiable acres. Eastern resorts have greater proximity to skiers who 
might be most influenced by snow reports in deciding whether and where to make a day- or 
weekend-trip (as measured by the population living in postal codes within 150 miles of the 
resort using U.S. and Canadian census data). Eastern resorts also face more competitors (as 
measured by the number of non-co-owned resorts within 50 miles).  
 Table 2, Panel B provides summary statistics for resort snow reports and snowfall data 
from government weather stations and SNODAS.  Average reported snowfall from resort 
reports is 23 percent higher on weekends than during the week (1.59 vs. 1.29 inches, p-value 
of difference = 0.025).  Resorts are 14 percent more likely to report at least some snow on 
weekend days (32.3 vs. 28.3 percent, p-value  0.016) and report 8 percent more snow 
conditional on reporting a positive amount (p-value 0.222).
17
                                                 
17  The p-values given, like the standard errors in the regressions that follow, allow for clustering of error terms 
within days and resorts. 
 Resorts report more snow than is 
reported in government weather data on both weekdays and weekends, although this could be 





 There is also more snow on weekends in government weather data, 
but the differences are smaller and statistically insignificant (p-values 0.316 and 0.184 in 
Table 2 Panel B, more below in Table 3). 
III. Results 
In this section, identify a weekend effect in resort snow reports, examine the cross-sectional 
determinants of that weekend effect, explore how consumer web site visits respond to snow 
reports, and estimate how the weekend effect changed with the introduction of an iPhone 
application that made it easier for skiers to post first-hand reports on snow conditions. 
Our starting point for testing for weekend effects is the OLS specification: 
srt = β*wt + aw + nr + ert  (1) 
where srt is natural new (or “fresh”) snowfall reported by resort r on day t, wt is an indicator 
variable for whether t is a weekend day, aw is a fixed effect for a specific calendar week 
(Wednesday-Tuesday), nr is a fixed effect for a resort, and ert is an error term. The fixed 
effects control for any bias arising from the proportion of snow reports on weekends varying 
between more and less snowy weeks of the year (e.g., if resorts were open only on weekends 
at the beginning and end of the season) or between more and less snowy resorts. Point 
estimates actually change very little when these fixed effects are dropped (Appendix Table 1), 
so these potential omitted variable biases do not appear important in practice. But the fixed 
effects do improve the efficiency of estimation by absorbing variation that would otherwise be 
                                                 
18 Although the SNODAS model estimates snowfall for precise locations, it does so partly by interpolating 
between government weather stations. Thus strategic ski resort location decisions might exploit mountain-by-
mountain variation in snowfall that SNODAS does not fully capture.     12 
 
captured by the error term. Appendix Table 1 also shows that the results are qualitatively 
similar if we use Tobit instead of OLS.
19
Since actual and reported snowfall may be correlated across resorts on the same day, we 
allow for clustering within day when calculating our standard errors. Since snow reports may 
be serially correlated, we also allow for clustering within resorts, using the two-dimensional 
clustering procedure in Petersen  (2009). Allowing for clustering within days does 
meaningfully affect standard errors, while clustering within resort has essentially no effect. 
 
Table 3 presents estimates of day of the week effects, and of weekend effects for various 
definitions of weekend (Sat-Sun, Fri-Sun), over the 2004-2008 seasons. In resort-reported 
snow (column 1), we find that the largest day of the week effects are for Saturday, Sunday, 
Friday, and Monday. Regardless of our definition of weekend, we find that resorts report 
0.20-0.25 more inches of new natural snow on weekends 
In contrast, we do not find statistically significant evidence of a weekend effect in weather 
station or SNODAS data (columns 2-4).  Point estimates of a weekend effect are positive for 
the sample of days for which we have a resort report, with magnitudes between 0.06 and 0.10 
inches, or between 23 and 43 percent of the weekend effect in resort-reported snow.  In 
contrast to the weekend effects in resort reports, the weekend effects in government reports 
are far from statistically significant (p-values range from 0.22 to 0.53), and they are not 
present to any meaningful extent when we examine the full sample of resort*days from the 
2004-2008 seasons.  In our tests below, we will control for government-reported snow when 
testing for weekend effects.  
                                                 
19 We also estimate specifications with resort*week fixed effects. This reduces degrees of freedom by about a 
third and increases the standard errors accordingly. The weekend effect point estimate is not statistically (or 
economically) significantly different from the specifications in Table 3, and the additional fixed effects are not 
collectively significant. See Appendix Table 1 for details.. 13 
 
 
Table 4 examines the effect of controlling for government weather data on our estimated 
weekend effects over the 2004-2008 seasons.
20
                                                 
20 Appendix Table 2 presents estimates of the weekend effect for various sub-periods (by year, by month, and by 
holiday vs. non-holiday). We do not have sufficient power to draw any firm inferences. 
 The first column presents our result from 
Table 3, Column 1 (Specification 2) for reference. Column 2 restricts the sample to resort-
days with a good match to government weather stations. Column 3 restricts the sample to 
resort-days with a good match to SNODAS. Columns 4-7 add controls for various functional 
forms of weather station snowfall: Column 4 includes same-day weather station snowfall and 
restricts its coefficient to be 1 (a difference-in-difference approach); Column 5 removes the 
coefficient restriction but continues to impose linearity (see below for more flexible fuctional 
forms);  Column 6 restricts the sample to observations with data for prior and next-day 
weather station snowfall; Column 7 adds controls for these leads and lags (longer leads and 
lags do not have statistically significant coefficients). Regardless of specification, adding 
these weather station controls reduces both the standard error and the point estimate on the 
weekend effect but leaves it economically and statistically significant. When we control for 
SNODAS estimates by differencing (Column 8), we use a weighted average of current and 
next-day reported snowfall, where the weights are derived from the overlaps of time periods 
with a 7am-7am local time window in the resort's time zone. This yields weights that are fairly 
similar to the coefficients estimated in Column 9.  Regardless of the approach, controlling for 
SNODAS instead of weather station estimates of snowfall produces weekend effect estimates 
between the unconditional (Column 3) and weather station (Column 4-7) specifications. In 
subsequent analysis, we focus on the specifications using differences between resort-reported 
and weather station or SNODAS snowfall estimates (Columns 4 and 8). 14 
 
Figure 1 provides a more flexible analysis of the relationship between resort and weather 
station-reported snow. We sort days into categories based on resort-reported snow and plot the 
average of weather station snowfall for both weekdays (blue, dashed, top line) and weekends 
(red, solid, bottom line).   The figure suggests that weekend exaggeration is largest for resort 
reports in the 6-12 inch range. This suggests that the weekend effect is increasing in the 
amount of actual snowfall, at least up to a "bliss point" of 10-12 inches.  Formal tests of this 
hypothesis do not reject a model with a constant weekend effect, however.  Figures using 
SNODAS estimates or a weighted average of weather station snow from days t+1, t, and t-1 
(using weights from Table 4, Column 7) yield similar results.  
Table 5 examines whether our results are affected by either selective reporting by resorts 
or by the selection of reports captured in our archives. Selective reporting could be due to 
(possibly also deceptive) practices by resorts or aggregators that are subtly different than 
reporting more snow than has actually fallen. For example, resorts with no new snow might 
prefer to leave up a stale report rather than report no new snow, and the optimality of this 
strategy might vary over the week (Columns 4-6). Similarly, we might be concerned that 
archiving was related to interest in a webpage, and thus might be related to snow in a way that 
varied over the week (Columns 1-3). In practice we find some evidence that reporting and 
archiving frequencies are very slightly higher when there is more actual snow (Columns 2, 5, 
and 8). But these effect sizes are tiny (compared to the dependent variable mean in the last 
row), and they disappear once we include our usual set of fixed effects for weeks and resorts 15 
 
(Columns 3, 6, and 9).
21
Next we estimate cross-resort differences in weekend effects.  Figure 2 plots the 
distribution of resort-level weekend effect estimates, with the resort count on the y-axis. The 
blue line (with the larger mass near zero) comes from a Bayesian posterior mixed (random 
coefficients) model; the red line comes from a noisier model that interacts the weekend 
indicator with resort fixed effects.
 More importantly, there is no evidence that selectivity differs on 
weekends (this key result is shown in the “Gov snow*Weekend” row).  
22
Table 6 tests whether the weekend effect is larger for resorts with characteristics that 
proxy for payoffs to exaggeration. (We report specifications that difference resort-reported 
and weather station snowfall; results are similar if we control for snowfall or difference with  
SNODAS instead). We find that resorts with expert terrain report 0.24 inches more fresh snow 
on weekdays (bottom panel) and an additional 0.17 extra inches of fresh snow on weekends 
(top panel).
 Both models suggest that the modal weekend effect is 
close to zero, and that a substantial number of resorts (perhaps 10 to 15 percent) exaggerate by 
0.5 inches or more on the weekends.  
23
                                                 
21 In particular, it is the inclusion of resort fixed effects that causes the relationship between snow and both 
reporting and archiving frequencies to disappear, suggesting that this relationship reflects snowier resorts 
reporting more frequently and snowier states being archived more frequently. 
 The main (weekday) effect could be due to resorts with expert terrain being 
especially well located, but the interaction (weekend) effect suggests that resorts with more 
expert terrain exaggerate their snowfall more on weekends because fresh snow is especially 
appealing to expert skiers. We also find some evidence of larger weekend effects for resorts 
22 We estimate the mixed model using the Generalized Linear Latent and Mixed Model (GLLAMM) procedure 
described in Rabe-Hesketh et al (2004). Both the GLLAMM model and the fixed effects model reject the null 
hypothesis of a constant weekend effect across resorts (with a p-value less than 0.0001 in both cases).   
23 We also estimate specifications that interact the share of terrain that is Intermediate, Advanced, and Expert 
with the weekend indicator (with Beginner terrain as the omitted category). These regressions find slightly 
positive but insignificant coefficients for Intermediate and Advanced terrain, and a positive and significant 
coefficient for Expert terrain. A regression including an indicator variable for any Expert terrain and a 
continuous variable for the share of Expert terrain suggests that the weekend effect is mostly associated with the 
former. This is consistent with resorts needing Expert terrain to be in expert skiers' choice sets, but with the exact 
amount being less important (or imprecisely measured). 16 
 
that  do  not offer money-back guarantees (i.e., the interactions between weekend and no 
guarantee are positive and significant). In contrast, we do not find a significant relationship 
between weekend effects and the number of neighboring (competing) resorts, or the number 
of people living within 150 miles driving distance from the resort, although our estimates here 
are quite noisy.
24
Next we explore whether consumers pierce the veil of resort exaggeration, using data on 
resort website visits  collected from a sample of internet users.
  Likewise, the differences in the weekend effect between resorts with 
different types of owners (publicly traded, private, or government), and between West vs. 
East, are insignificant and imprecisely estimated. 
25  We measure visits by 
counting unique website visitors from IP addresses within 150 miles of a given resort, before 
10AM. A resort snow report can drive traffic to its website because, as noted above, resort 
reports are rebroadcast by third-party aggregator websites and offline media outlets. 
Consumers exposed to a rebroadcast may then visit a resort website to get additional 
information on conditions, prices, services, and other aspects of trip planning.
26
Table 7, Column 1 reports Poisson regressions showing that, across all resort-days in this 
website visit sample (January 2007-May 2008, excluding the non-ski-season months June-Oct 
2007), visits increase by more than 100% for each additional inch of government-reported 
snow, and by 61% for each additional inch of resort-reported snow. Visits do not respond 
 So website 
visits are a useful, if incomplete, measure of consumer demand responses to resort snowfall 
reports. 
                                                 
24 We define two resorts as competitors if they are within 50 miles (as the crow flies), are not under common 
ownership, and either both or neither have expert terrain. Permuting the definition does not change the results. 
25 We conducted this study without industry cooperation, and hence we do not have access to demand data from 
the resorts themselves. Nearly all resorts are privately held so publicly available financial information on them is 
scarce, particularly at the daily frequency. 
26 Unfortunately we lack data on these within-site clicks that would enable us to observe what sorts of content 
site visitors peruse. 17 
 
differently to government-reported snow on weekends, but are sharply less responsive to 
resort-reported snow on weekends (the Resort snow*Weekend row in the table); in fact, our 
results suggest that consumers only respond to additional resort-reported snow on weekdays. 
The next four  columns of Table 7 explore whether visits respond for resorts with 
characteristics associated with larger weekend effects in Table 6: Expert terrain (Column 2, 
vs. no Expert terrain in Column 3) and No Guarantee (Column 4, vs. Column 5). We do not 
find strong evidence that skiers discount weekend reports by these resorts more strongly; i.e., 
we do not find significant differences in the Resort snow*Weekend coefficients in Column 2 
vs. Column 3, or in Column 4 vs. Column 5. In all, the website visit results suggest that 
consumers are skeptical of resorts’ weekend reports of fresh snowfall but may not completely 
pierce the veil on the nature and extent of weekend exaggeration. 
Finally, we examine the effect of a change to the information environment on 
exaggeration. On January 8, 2009, SkiReport.com introduced a feature in its popular iPhone 
application that allows users to file "first-hand" reports. These reports are then posted below 
the resort's official snow report (Figure 3). Although users previously had the ability to file 
first-hand reports on the SkiReport.com website, the iPhone application made it much easier 
to do so from the phone (as opposed to a computer), and hence file in real time (e.g., from the 
chair lift).
27
In addition to the time shock (pre- vs. post- iPhone application launch), we also exploit 
cross-sectional differences in iPhone coverage to identify resorts that were plausibly more or 
less affected by the new “app”. Coverage maps from AT&T (the sole network provider for the 
 The volume of first-hand reports increased dramatically following the feature 
launch (Figure 4).  
                                                 
27 Even if first-hand reports are not always posted to the aggregator site in real-time, the threat of negative 
feedback being posted eventually could raise the cost of exaggeration and hence provide a deterrent.   18 
 
iPhone in the United States during our sample period) do not account well for topography, so 
we classify a resort as covered (and hence more-affected) if it was the subject of 10 or more 
first-hand reports after January 8, 2009 that did not  mention snow quality.
28
Table 8 presents estimates of how the iPhone application affected resort reporting.. As in 
Table 6, the dependent variable measures the difference between resort-reported and weather 
station snow. Table 8, Columns 5 and 6, present the key result here: iPhone coverage*post-
app launch*weekend is strongly negative (-0.266 or -0.221, depending on control variable 
specification), and significant. I.e., these results suggest that resorts with iPhone reception 
basically stopped exaggerating weekend snowfall after the app launched. Columns 2, 4, and 6 
suggest that this is not an artifact of seasonality in weekend effects (that varies with 
coverage): the point estimates on (weekend)*(post-Jan 8 in any season) are negative and 
insignificant, as are the point estimates on (weekend)*(coverage)*(post-Jan 8 in any season). 
  This low 
threshold for measuring coverage minimizes concerns about endogeneity, and allows for the 
possibility that the mere threat of negative first-hand reports might be sufficient to deter resort 
exaggeration in equilibrium (although there are in fact many skier reports questioning the 
veracity of resort reports).  
The results on the other variables shown in Table 8 are interesting in their own right but 
do not affect the main inference that the iPhone app greatly curbed exaggeration at resorts 
with better reception (relative to resorts with no or worse coverage). The significant and 
positive results on weekend*Post-launch suggest that resorts  generally  received relatively 
much fresh snow (relative to government reports) post-January  8th during the 2008-2009 
season (and/or that resorts exaggerated more during the week than in previous time periods). 
                                                 
28 Most reports are indeed about something other than fresh snowfall (e.g., food, socializing, other aspects of trail 
access or conditions). See e.g., Figure 3. 19 
 
The significant and positive results on coverage*post-launch suggest that whatever was 
happening (more microclimate snow and/or more weekday exaggeration) was stronger at 
resorts with good iPhone reception. The nearly significant and positive results on 
weekend*coverage suggest that covered resorts tended to have larger initial weekend effects.   
 
IV. Conclusion 
We provide some unusually sharp empirical evidence on the extent, mechanics, and dynamics 
of deceptive advertising. 
Ski resorts self-report significantly and substantially more natural snowfall on weekends; 
there is no  significant  weekend effect in government snowfall data gleaned from three 
different sources. There is some evidence that resorts with greater benefits from exaggerating- 
those with expert terrain and without money-back guarantees-- do it more. The evidence on 
whether competition restrains or encourages exaggeration is  inconclusive.  Data on resort 
website visits suggest that consumer demand responds strongly to snow reports (both resort- 
and government-issued), that skiers were quite skeptical of resort reports on weekend, but that 
they did not fully pierce the veil on the nature and extent of resort exaggeration. Near the end 
of our sample period, we observe a shock to the information environment: a new iPhone 
application feature makes it easier for skiers to comment on resort ski conditions in real time. 
Exaggeration of weekend fresh snowfall by resorts with better iPhone reception falls sharply. 
In all, the results suggest that deceptive advertising about product quality varies sharply 
with incentives, both within resorts (over time, at high-frequencies), and across resorts. They 
also suggest that consumers responded only weakly to exaggerated claims, and hence that 
advertisers reaped few benefits from deception in equilibrium. This may help explain why a 20 
 
simple technology shock (the launch of the iPhone app) seems to have changed the 
equilibrium by dramatically reducing weekend exaggeration at resorts with better iPhone 
reception. 
Although our setting may be unusual with its high-frequency variation in product quality, 
we speculate that our findings are broadly applicable. They relate to many classes of models 
on signaling, deception, obfuscation, and search costs. Search and information costs loom 
large in many other markets where product availability and pricing vary at high frequencies. 
Some of these markets presumably have conditions that are even more ripe for deceptive 
advertising than ours, with, for example, purchase decisions that  are lower-stakes,  have 
quality realizations with longer lags, or embed  fewer opportunities for repeat play and 
learning. 
A particularly important direction for future research is to combine evidence on the nature 
and dynamics of deceptive advertising with richer evidence on consumer responses. This is 
critical for examining whether and how consumers pierce the veil of deception, and for 
measuring the welfare effects of deceptive advertising and innovations that amplify or 
discourage it. 21 
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 Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Resorts and Reports by Region and Year
Total w/Weather Station w/SNODAS All w/Weather Station w/SNODAS
Region
Eastern U.S. 232 227 195 38,683 34,092 18,808
Western U.S. 135 131 125 34,339 26,895 21,112
Eastern Canada 41 41 0 5,640 4,088 0
Western Canada 29 10 0 6,148 1,254 0
Total 437 409 320 84,810 66,329 39,920
Season
2004-5 354 223 268 4,054 1,544 2,829
2005-6 363 310 277 4,807 2,566 3,714
2006-7 393 359 299 15,376 12,812 11,354
2007-8 429 399 315 32,165 26,197 22,023
2008-9 405 373 0 28,408 23,210 0
Total 437 409 320 84,810 66,329 39,920
We define Eastern resorts as those located in states and provinces that are entirely east of the Continental Divide.
Ski resorts Daily snow reportsTable 2.  Descriptive Statistics: Resort and Snow (Report) Characteristics
Panel A.  Resort characteristics Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Terrain type (%)
Beginner 27 11 29 11 22 10
Intermediate 41 12 41 12 42 11
Advanced 25 13 25 12 26 13
Expert 7 11 5 9 10 15
% with any expert terrain 42 40 46
Base elevation 3132 2946 1157 901 6419 2111
Summit elevation 4373 3580 1922 1178 8455 2266
Vertical drop 1242 1004 764 620 2036 1019
Lifts 7.8 5.1 7.1 3.7 8.8 6.7
Runs 41 35 29 24 63 42
Acres 671 1114 155 168 1461 1438
LN(Population within 150 mile radius) 15.5 1.2 16.1 1.0 14.6 1.0
Competing resorts within 50 miles 5.9 4.8 6.3 5 5.2 4.3
% Offering money-back guarantee 3.9 4.8 2.4
% with iPhone coverage 66.8 65.2 69.5
Type of ownership (%)
Publicly traded 3.2 1.8 5.5
Private 89.9 91.6 87.2
Government 6.9 6.6 7.3
Panel B.  Natural Snowfall
% of days with snowfall in range Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend
0" 71.7 67.7 51.2 49.0 50.3 46.5
0.01 to 0.49 14.2 14.7 15.1 14.9
0.50 to 1.49 6.7 7.7 14.1 14.8 11.3 12.7
1.50 to 2.49 5.2 5.7 6.9 6.8 5.9 6.6
2.50 to 3.49 3.4 4.1 4.3 3.9 4.2 4.3
3.50 to 4.49 3.1 3.4 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.0
4.50 to 5.49 1.9 2.0 1.8 2.3 2.8 3.3
5.50 or more 8.0 9.4 5.0 5.8 7.5 8.7
Mean snowfall 1.29 1.59 1.05 1.15 1.17 1.32
SD snowfall 3.16 4.13 2.27 2.38 2.11 2.20
Observations 40,398 16,004 34,065 13,676 28,308 11,612
% on weekend
P-value (H0: % weekend = 2/7)
States and provinces that are entirely east of the Continental Divide are considered Eastern.  Resorts are considered to have iPhone coverage 
if they received 10 or more iPhone first-hand reports about subjects other than snow quality.  P-values reported are for a test of the null 
hypothesis that the proportion of snow reports on a weekend day (Saturday or Sunday) is 2/7.  These tests allow for clustering of 
observations on days.  Data in Panel B is for the 2004-8 seasons.
29.1% 28.6% 28.4%
0.845 0.978 0.94
All resorts (437) Eastern resorts (273) Western resorts (164)
Resort-reported Weather station SNODASTable 3.  Day of week effects in reported snowfall, 2004-2008
Dependent variable:  Inches of new natural snowfall reported 
Resorts SNODAS
All w/Resort report w/Resort report
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specification 1.  Day of week indicator variables (Sunday omitted)
Monday -0.145 0.074 0.147 -0.005
(0.166) (0.056) (0.157) (0.144)
Tuesday -0.389*** 0.016 -0.264** -0.092
(0.149) (0.054) (0.121) (0.154)
Wednesday -0.231 0.032 -0.048 0.0439
(0.162) (0.055) (0.152) (0.160)
Thursday -0.388** 0.001 -0.237* 0.128
(0.165) (0.052) (0.137) (0.168)
Friday -0.131 0.043 0.000 0.101
(0.156) (0.051) (0.144) (0.165)
Saturday -0.006 0.007 -0.027 0.242
(0.161) (0.055) (0.139) (0.157)
F-test p-value 0.0550 0.2413 0.136 0.356
R^2 0.123 0.0403 0.166 0.133
Specification 2.  Two-day weekend indicator variable (Sat&Sun)
Weekend 0.246** -0.029 0.057 0.096
(0.099) (0.033) (0.090) (0.092)
R^2 0.123 0.0403 0.163 0.131
Specification 3.  Three-day weekend indicator variable (Fri-Sun)
Weekend 0.238*** -0.014 0.086 0.102
(0.089) (0.030) (0.084) (0.083)
R^2 0.123 0.0401 0.163 0.131
Observations 56,402 231,952 47,741 39,920
Unique days 752 1,026 709 707
OLS with fixed effects for weeks (Wed-Tues) and resort.  Column 2 includes every weather station 
reading taken from October-May from a station that is matched with a ski resort, regardless of whether a 
resort report is available for that day or not.  Standard errors allow for clustering within both day and 
resort.
Weather stationsTable 4.  Weekend effect regressions 2004-2008, controlling for actual snowfall per government data
Dependent variable:  Inches of new natural snowfall reported by resort
Dependent variable 
Observations include w/Station data w/SNODAS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Weekend (Sat&Sun) 0.246** 0.203** 0.242** 0.146** 0.164*** 0.131** 0.125** 0.173* 0.183**
(0.099) (0.099) (0.117) (0.060) (0.062) (0.062) (0.059) (0.093) (0.089)
Gov (t+1) 0.053** .25 to .375 0.359***
(0.024) (0.025)
Gov (t) 1 0.684*** 0.736*** 0.672*** .625 to .75 0.621***
(0.047) (0.051) (0.048) (0.029)
Gov (t-1) 0.180*** 0.104***
(0.025) (0.020)
Observations 56,402 47,741 39,920 47,741 47,741 43,119 43,119 39,920 39,920
Unique days 752 692 707 692 692 692 692 707 707
R^2 0.123 0.117 0.141 0.093 0.294 0.303 0.317 0.084 0.351
OLS with fixed effects for weeks (Wed-Tues) and resort.  Columns 4 constrains the coefficient on current-day snow to be one; column 7 constrains the coefficients on current and future-day SNODAS snow to sum to one, with 
the proportions determined by the number of hours in the 7AM-to-7AM local time window that overlap with the SNODAS observation window in question (weights are 0.75 on t and 0.25 on t+1 for the Eastern time zone; 
and 0.625 and 0.375 respectively for the Pacific time zone).  Columns 2-9 are restricted to observations with either weather station or SNODAS data for days t-1 to t+1.  Standard errors allow for clustering within both day 
and resort.
Resort, controlling for weather station snow Resort, controlling for SNODAS Resort
w/Station data (t+1, t, t-1) w/SNODAS (t+1, t, t-1)Table 5.  Tests for selection biases in resort snow reports
Dependent variable:  = 1 if observation is archived and/or resort issued snow report
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Weekend (Sat or Sun) -0.0099 -0.0180 -0.0389 0.0068 0.0044 0.0116 -0.0020 -0.0106 -0.0132
(0.0320) (0.0327) (0.0663) (0.0091) (0.0104) (0.0421) (0.0285) (0.0289) (0.0532)
Gov snow (NOHRSC/NOAA) 0.0079* -0.0048 0.0040*** -0.0095 0.0066* -0.0052
(0.0042) (0.0108) (0.0016) (0.0070) (0.0037) (0.0088)
Gov snow*Weekend 0.0095 0.0063 0.0032 0.0163 0.0101 0.0116
(0.0074) (0.0195) (0.0031) (0.0129) (0.0062) (0.0150)
Fixed effects
Week (Wed-Tues)? yes yes yes
State or resort? state resort resort
Observations 20,603 19,886 19,841 59,737 57,488 54,105 154,556 152,307 149,515
Dependent variable mean
The table reports marginal effects from probit regressions predicting whether a state's page was archived on a given day, and whether a resort snow report is available for a specific day (conditional on the page 
being archived and unconditional).  The sample includes every day in the 2004-2008 seasons (October 1 to May 31) for every resort between the resort's opening and closing date (as determined by the first and 
last day a resort snow report is issued).  Since the variation in the regressions in the first three columns is at the state*day level, they include one data point for each state*day, but observations are weighted by 
the number of resorts in the state.  Actual snow is measured using the average snowfall reported by the NOAA stations matched to the state's resorts.  Standard errors adjust for clustering within day.
Did resort issue a fresh report? Is report in dataset?
0.42 0.86 0.37
Was state*day page archived?
(conditional on page being archived) (page archived & resort issued report)Table 6.  Variation in weekend effects by resort characteristics, 2004-8 seasons
Dependent variable:  Resort - NOHRSC/NOAA snow
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Weekend (Sat&Sun) 0.146** 0.061 -0.012 -0.093 -0.103 -0.062 -0.088
(0.058) (0.068) (0.082) (0.089) (0.097) (0.105) (0.089)
Interaction effects with weekend
Expert terrain > 0 0.169** 0.170** 0.171** 0.173** 0.173** 0.168**
(0.075) (0.074) (0.074) (0.073) (0.074) (0.072)
West 0.140 0.139 0.162 0.138 0.135
(0.150) (0.150) (0.189) (0.150) (0.151)
No money back guarantee 0.196*** 0.191*** 0.193*** 0.194***
   (0.073) (0.070) (0.072) (0.072)
1/(1+number of competitors within 50 miles) 0.019
(0.065)
Ln(Population within 150 miles), normalized -0.084
(0.150)





Expert terrain > 0 0.240*** 0.235*** 0.236*** 0.232*** 0.238*** 0.234***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
West 0.540*** 0.540*** 0.499*** 0.538*** 0.537***
(0.082) (0.082) (0.103) (0.082) (0.082)
No money back guarantee 0.039 0.049 0.037 0.038
   (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
1/(1+number of competitors within 50 miles) -0.035
(0.034)
Ln(Population within 150 miles), normalized -0.095
(0.070)




Observations 47,741 47,741 47,741 47,741 47,741 47,741 47,741
Unique days 692 692 692 692 692 692 692
R^2 0.310 0.316 0.326 0.327 0.327 0.327 0.333
OLS with fixed effects for weeks (Wed-Tues) and resort. Standard errors allow for clustering within both day and resort. Two resorts are considered competitors if they are within 50 miles, are 
not under common ownership, and either both or neither have expert terrain. Sample size drops in the last two columns because we were not able to find data for many resorts on guarantees 
and ownership.Table 7.  Snow reports and resort-web site visitors
Dependent variable:  Unique resort web site visitors (residing within 150 miles, before 10 AM local time)
Full sample
Yes No No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Resort-reported snow 0.028*** 0.033*** 0.018 0.035*** 0.029**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012)
Resort snow*Weekend -0.027*** -0.029* -0.020 -0.032** -0.018
(0.012) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.016)
Gov snow (NOHRSC/NOAA) 0.059** 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.063*** 0.042***
(0.014) (0.019) (0.022) (0.020) (0.016)
Gov snow*Weekend 0.008 -0.006 0.019 0.003 0.011
(0.020) (0.035) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
Weekend 0.234*** 0.228** 0.246*** 0.155 0.309***
(0.072) (0.097) (0.095) (0.106) (0.106)
Observations 35,320 16,560 18,760 31,800 3,520
Dep var mean 0.046 0.054 0.040 0.054 0.029
    
Expert terrain? Money back guaranteeTable 8.  First-hand reporting (via iPhones) and the weekend effect
Dependent variable:  Resort - NOHRSC/NOAA snow
Time period 2004-08 seasons 2004-08 seasons 2004-08 seasons 2004-08 seasons 2004-09 seasons 2004-09 seasons
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Weekend (Sat&Sun) 0.146** 0.257** 0.062 0.137 0.039 0.050
(0.058) (0.101) (0.077) (0.126) (0.073) (0.126)
Interaction effects with weekend
Post-Jan8 (1/8 or later in any season) -0.166 -0.108 -0.018
(0.123) (0.156) (0.157)
Post-launch (1/8/2009 or later) 0.237** 0.244*
(0.120) (0.131)
iPhone coverage at resort 0.107 0.152 0.120* 0.195
(0.070) (0.134) (0.066) (0.124)
iPhone coverage*post-Jan8 -0.072 -0.119
(0.155) (0.147)
iPhone coverage*post-launch -0.266*** -0.221**
(0.094) (0.101)
Main effects
iPhone coverage*post-Jan8 0.133* 0.100
(0.080) (0.079)
iPhone coverage*post-launch 0.226*** 0.190***
(0.061) (0.066)
Observations 47,741 47,741 47,741 47,741 72,569 72,569
Unique days 692 692 692 692 813 813
R^2 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.091 0.091
OLS regressions with fixed effects for week (Wed-Tues) and resort.  To keep week fixed effects and the post-launch and post-Jan 8 variables synchronized, Post-Jan 
8/Launch refers to weeks (Wed-Tues) beginning after January 7.  The main effects for post-Jan 8 and post-launch are therefore absorbed by the week fixed effects, and 
the main effect for iPhone coverage at resort is absorbed by the resort fixed effect.  Standard errors allow for clustering within both day and resort.  We classify a resort 
as covered if it was the subject of 10 or more first-hand reports after January 8, 2009 that did not mention snow quality.Appendix Table 1.  Alternative specifications for 2004-2008 -- fixed effects and tobit
Dependent variable:  Inches of new natural snowfall reported by resort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specifications without actual snow controls Table 4, Col 1 No FEs Resort FEs Week FEs Resort*week FEs Tobit
Weekend (Sat&Sun) 0.246** 0.297** 0.277** 0.274*** 0.230* 0.994**
(0.099) (0.133) (0.134) (0.100) (0.135) (0.397)
Constant 1.229*** 1.297*** 1.302*** 1.303*** 1.316*** -5.063***
(0.077) (0.0665) (0.0665) (0.0491) (0.0598) (0.335)
Ln(Sigma) 8.341***
(0.301)
Observations 56,402 56,402 56,402 56,402 56,402 56,402
Unique days 755 755 755 755 755 755
R^2 0.123 0.001 0.064 0.060 0.453 N/A
Resort-reported - weather station snow Table 4, Col 4 No FEs Resort FEs Week FEs Resort*week FEs Tobit
Weekend (Sat&Sun) 0.146** 0.146* 0.136* 0.155** 0.137* 0.694**
(0.060) (0.082) (0.079) (0.062) (0.076) (0.276)
Constant 0.403*** 0.377*** 0.337*** 0.403*** 0.333*** -6.033***
(0.0476) (0.0455) (0.0497) (0.0476) (0.0781) (0.367)
Ln(Sigma) 6.976***
(0.304)
Observations 47,741 47,741 47,741 47,741 47,741 47,741
Unique days 692 692 692 692 692 692
R^2 0.093 0.000 0.070 0.025 0.425 N/A
Resort-reported - SNODAS snow Table 4, Col 8 No FEs Resort FEs Week FEs Resort*week FEs Tobit
Weekend (Sat&Sun) 0.173* 0.189* 0.180 0.185** 0.154 0.692**
(0.085) (0.114) (0.112) (0.093) (0.131) (0.323)
Constant -0.034 -0.0239 -0.0249 0.0343 0.0843 -6.941***
(0.050) (0.0431) (0.0462) (0.0533) (0.0862) (0.343)
Ln(Sigma) 6.866***
(0.229)
Observations 39,920 39,920 39,920 39,920 39,920 39,920
Unique days 707 707 707 707 707 707
R^2 0.3434 0.2859 0.323 0.3075 0.5848 N/A
Note:  Regressions are estimated by OLS or Tobit and include the indicated fixed effects.  Standard errors allow for clustering within both date and resort.  Week fixed effects are for Wednesday-
Tuesday weeks (to include a weekend and the immediately surrounding weekdays).  Tobit models control for rather than difference weather station and SNODAS snow.Appendix Table 2.  Weekend effect estimates for sub-periods, 2004-2008
Dependent variable:  Inches of new natural snowfall reported by resort
Obs. Coef. SE Obs. Coef. SE Obs. Coef. SE
All observations 56,402 0.246** (0.097) 47,741 0.146** (0.058) 39,920 0.173* (0.088)
2004-5 Season 4,054 0.152 (0.410) 2,218 0.772* (0.393) 2,829 0.107 (0.331)
2005-6 Season 4,807 0.571 (0.367) 3,463 0.327 (0.277) 3,714 0.223 (0.280)
2006-7 Season 15,376 0.248 (0.184) 13,518 -0.034 (0.090) 11,354 0.210* (0.111)
2007-8 Season 32,165 0.219* (0.130) 28,542 0.152** (0.076) 22,023 0.157 (0.133)
November 2,581 0.591 (0.357) 1,811 0.347 (0.351) 2,051 0.147 (0.306)
December 10,271 -0.029 (0.194) 8,720 0.111 (0.125) 7,140 0.182 (0.159)
January 12,247 0.521* (0.290) 10,611 0.368** (0.143) 8,495 0.479 (0.296)
February 11,932 0.088 (0.201) 10,304 0.159 (0.142) 9,137 -0.037 (0.200)
March 14,653 0.372* (0.190) 12,623 0.032 (0.121) 9,704 0.157 (0.131)
April and May 4,718 -0.054 (0.207) 3,672 -0.032 (0.164) 3,393 0.044 (0.168)
Christmas holiday 3,683 -0.056 (0.277) 3,157 -0.047 (0.224) 1,746 -0.298 (0.202)
President's day week 2,395 0.509 (0.301) 2,119 0.307* (0.167) 1,841 0.019 (0.207)
Other periods 50,324 0.254** (0.106) 42,465 0.132** (0.062) 36,333 0.189** (0.094)
West 28,880 0.385** (0.172) 21,686 0.281*** (0.108) 21,112 0.332** (0.141)
East 27,522 0.092 (0.126) 26,055 0.041 (0.057) 18,808 0.003 (0.105)
U.S. 49,215 0.234** (0.106) 44,318 0.168*** (0.058)
Canada 7,187 0.315** (0.130) 3,423 -0.212 (0.216)
This table repeats the specifications in Table 4 (columns 1, 4, and 8) for subsamples of the data.
































































Figure 1.  Government and resort-reported snow 
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Figure 2.  Distribution of resort-level estimates of weekend effects 
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Figure 4.  Total resort reviews posted on Skireport.com, by source 
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